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Letter from the Director
The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy (JGI),
which is part of the Steven J. Green School of International and Public Affairs (SIPA) at Florida International University (FIU), is launching Global
Security Review in an effort to bridge the divide
between academia and the policy world. The first
issue addresses a wide range of threats that impact national security.
Some countries in the Americas have been
plagued by high levels of drug trafficking and
organized crime. States such as Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Colombia, and Brazil have experienced high levels of drug-related violence as
transnational organized crime groups fight for
control of drug routes and territory.
In addition to drug trafficking, countries in the
Western Hemisphere confront challenges with
regard to energy security and climate change.
Some scholars contend that security begins with
the environment.
Many governments are searching for alternatives
sources of energy and new methods of extracting
energy, such as hydraulic fracturing, or fracking.
Practices such as fracking have been controversial in nature as some scholars argue that these
techniques can lead to earthquakes and can contaminate water wells. Finally, other politicians and
policymakers have sought to elevate the threat of
terrorism and violent extremism on the security
agenda. Fears exist that the Western Hemisphere
is vulnerable to terrorist attacks, particularly from
ISIS fighters who are returning home to their
countries of origin in the Caribbean.
The first article by Dr. Robert Jervis of Columbia University addresses the threat of terrorism.
Despite common perceptions and various recent
terror attacks, Dr. Jervis contends that the U.S. is
safer than people believe. Dr. Jervis’s article is fol-
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lowed by a piece by Dr. Jonathan D. Rosen (FIU)
and Dr. Bruce Bagley (University of Miami) on Plan
Colombia, a multi-billion dollar counternarcotics
initiative financed by the U.S. government. The
authors analyze the results of the initiative and
provide insight as to whether Plan Colombia can
be used as a model for other countries. The next
article in the journal is by Dr. Marten Brienen of
Oklahoma State University and examines energy
security in the U.S. Dr. Brienen explores the energy
profile of the U.S. as well as the major threats to
energy security. This article is followed by Dr. Anthony Clayton’s (University of the West Indies) article on terrorism in the Caribbean. He highlights
the recent trends in terrorism, focusing on ISIS/
Daesh, which he refers to as the “social media generation terrorists.” Next, University of Miami scholar Dr. Daniel Suman’s work begins with an analysis
of ecosecurity and highlights the key trends and
challenges in climate change in Florida. Finally,
the journal concludes with an article on cybersecurity by Mark M. Deen of FIU that focuses on nation-state hacking.
In conclusion, we hope that you enjoy our first
issue of Global Security Review. This journal will
be published once per year and will attempt to
publish articles from leading scholars and practitioners that address many of the pressing national security threats. In addition, JGI will continue
hosting conferences and workshops and publishing policy papers, reports, books, and articles on
pressing public policy and national security issues.

Sincerely,
Brian Fonseca, Director
The Jack D. Gordon Institute for Public Policy
Florida International University
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We’re Safer than You Think
Robert Jervis, Columbia University

es of the latter would of course be dreadful, but nothing like the civilization-ending impact of the former.

of us do every day is to cross the street; deaths from
traffic accidents dwarf those from terrorism. The comparison to the Cold War is also telling; although there
is no objective estimate of how likely nuclear war was
then, let alone of how likely nuclear war with Russia
or China is in the foreseeable future, the consequenc-

Unprecedented Security

So why are people saying such foolish things? In
part—but I believe only in small part—people are
consciously exaggerating for bureaucratic, political,
Abstract
or personal reasons. It would hardly behoove the
This article examines terrorism, arguing that the goal head of the intelligence establishment to say someof terrorists is to invoke fear into individuals. The con- thing like: “Although there are no grave dangers to
sequences of terrorist attacks in San Bernardino and American national security, there are a lot of smaller
Paris, among other places, is that the perceptions that problems we need to be aware of and multiple interterrorism is a threat to national security are high. This ests that while less than vital, still require attention.”
work contends that such fears are unwarranted as it Not only budgets but people’s sense of mission are
is more likely that one dies in a traffic accident than entangled with believing that what they do is vital.
a terrorist attack. Delving into the International Rela- During political campaigns (which consume more
tions literature, this article highlights the current de- and more of the electoral cycle) advantage often goes
to a candidate or a party that can claim that the opbates about terrorism and threats to security.
ponents dangerously neglect American security. The
media also has both an interest in playing up danIn the wake of the terrorist attacks in Paris and San ger and an outlook that focuses on them. Bad news
Bernardino, fear is on the rise. A December 2015 poll is generally good for circulation, and reporters and
showed 40 percent of the American people saying editors believe that it is their responsibility to keep a
that national security and terrorism were their top sharp eye out for threats to the country.
concern, with job creation and economic growth com- But this does not explain why so many members of
ing in a distant second at 23 percent.1 But even before the general public are fearful. In part, of course, they
these dramatic and disturbing events, political elites are picking up on the cues provided by the elites. This
in the U.S., probably more than mass opinion, were is not all there is to it, however. Although most of the
worried. In 2009, two-thirds of the members of the dangers to our lives come in the form of everyday
Council on Foreign Relations reported believing that activities like driving, people both overestimate the
the world the U.S. faced was more dangerous than it degree of control they have over their lives and are
had been during the Cold War.2 Three years later the more fearful of risks they feel that they cannot conChairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin trol. We incorrectly think that we are about-average
Dempsey, claimed, “We are living in the most danger- drivers and that if are careful we can take care of ourous time in my lifetime,”3 and the director of National selves. By contrast, it is next to impossible for any of
Intelligence James Clapper, similarly said, “Looking us to influence the chance of dying in a terrorist atback over my more than a half century in intelligence tack. Furthermore, each terrorist attack gets deeply
I have not experienced a time when we’ve been beset embedded in our memories because they are vivid
by more crises and threats around the globe.”4 Taking and widely covered in the media, and the irony is that
these concerns to heart, on December 22, 2015 the the extensive coverage is due to the fact that they
Dallas symphony cancelled its European tour “due to are so rare. Even traffic accidents that kill significant
the recent and tragic events in Europe and the Unit- numbers of people, such as bad bus accidents, occur
ed States, and based on extensive conversations with frequently enough so that we have come to expect
national and international security professionals.”5
them. The very fact that terrorism is so infrequent
The point of this brief article is that these fears are makes an instance unexpected and therefore more
unwarranted.6 The most dangerous thing I and most impactful.
The greatest threat to national security comes from
war among the major powers, and so our starting
point is that those who are so worried have lost sight
of the fact that the world used to be dangerous beGlobal Security Review | 4

cause these states used to fight each other with some
regularity. By contrast, currently the leading powers—
the U.S., the states that form the EU, and Japan—form
a security community.7 According to Karl Deutsch, a
security community is a group of countries who not
only are at peace, but among whom war is unthinkable.8 This is a very restricted category. Even countries
who remain at peace with each other for prolonged
periods often think about and plan for war with one
another. It is exceedingly rare for major states to fail
to do so, and when they have put the thought of war
between them out of their minds, the reason often is
the pressing threat from a common enemy. Indeed,
it was the perception of a common threat from the
USSR that was partly responsible for the rise of the security community, but that country’s demise has not
led to the community’s demise.
The importance of this break with the past hardly can
be exaggerated: it is not an exaggeration to say that
the history of world politics has been dominated by
war and the shadow of war among the most powerful
states. My definition of leading powers excludes Russia and the PRC, and a skeptic might argue that it was
designed with that purpose in mind. Nevertheless,
even if a war involving these two countries remains
possible, one reason why these possibilities receive
as much attention as they do is the lack of greater
dangers. Furthermore, when we look at the possible
causes of a war between NATO and Russia or the U.S.
(and/or Japan) and China we see that, despite some
overheated rhetoric growing out of conflicts over
Ukraine and the East and South China seas, the issues
are not direct and vital to the U.S. That is, only those
with overheated imaginations can envision Russia as
a military threat to Europe, and the danger to the U.S.
arising from China’s rise is indirect only, stemming as
it does from the maintenance of America’s Cold War
alliances in East Asia.
China does indeed challenge the U.S. dominance in
East Asia, but even leaving aside the pacifying effects
of nuclear weapons and high levels of economic interdependence, the U.S. has room to accommodate
the rising power and the level of threat is much lower than that which characterized much of IR in the
past. The same is true for the proliferation of nuclear
weapons, another issue high on the American agenda. Even those who reject the argument that proliferation will be stabilizing have difficulty estimating the
magnitude of the danger, and therefore the level of
effort and resources that should be arrayed against it.

Although rank-ordering these and other threats is difficult, more difficult still is putting them on some absolute scale. The result, I believe, is that the American
leadership if not the mass public has lost its sense of
proportion in the international dangers being posed,
and concomitantly has failed to see how much safer
we are now.
In other words, the leading powers now have an unprecedented degree of security, or at least security
against threats from other countries (I am leaving
aside the dangers of climate change and other menaces from nature even if we can trace them to human
activities), and the result is to give greater salience to
minor threats like terrorism.
Francis Fukuyama famously declared the “end of history.” Understood—or rather misunderstood—as the
claim that history and conflict had come to an end,
this is clearly incorrect. But this is not what Fukuyama
argued. His claim is that we have seen the end of
clashing ideologies that purport to be universally
valid and that, as such, seek to spread themselves
throughout the world.9 There is much to this. While
the ideology of liberalism, democracy, and capitalism,
far from converting everyone, has spurred a backlash,
there is no other general contender such as fascism or
communism. Islamic fundamentalism (the term is imprecise if not misleading, but there is no other one in
widespread use) rejects and seeks to exclude Western
liberalism, but in no realistic sense aspires to spread
its truth to the entire world. The PRC has also followed
its own path, and the combination of some degree
of economic liberalization coupled with authoritarian
rule and enriching the leaders has produced dramatic
results. But China has not touted this as a model for
others to follow, its success may depend on factors
particularly Chinese, and others have not flocked to
approach.
As Arnold Wolfers explains, when states have met
their needs for security and autonomy, they often
turn toward what he called “milieu goals”10 which
arise from non-material motives. For the West today,
this means democracy, human rights, and limits on if
not the elimination of corruption. These embody the
way of life in the West, or, to be more precise, the way
the West likes to see itself. The argument for spreading these values and ways of behaving is partly that
they will enhance international cooperation and so
be in the interests of the West, but at least as important is that they will benefit the societies that adopt
them. Whether or not this is the case is fortunately
Global Security Review | 5

beyond my scope here; all that is relevant is the claim ical agents or nuclear weapons (a “dirty bomb” that
that milieu goals are increasingly important in world would use conventional explosives to spread radiopolitics.
active material is a borderline case). To estimate the
probability that terrorists could obtain such weapons
One large open question is the extent to which the
is subject to dispute and beyond my expertise.12 But
West, and especially the U.S., will seek to impose its we should note that even if terrorists could steal or
values on others by force, a question which is relat- make such weapons, they would also have to bring
ed to whether its leaders believe that countries with them to an American or a European city, a feat that
different social systems are a threat to it. The obvious makes the Paris attack seem like child’s play in comexample is the war against Saddam Hussein’s regime parison. The danger cannot be dismissed, of course,
in Iraq in 2003, which I believe can be traced in large and one irony is that fear as reflected in government
part to the fact that President George W. Bush held policy may be a self-denying prophecy. Because govwhat Kenneth Waltz called a “second image” theory of ernment officials are themselves deeply worried, or
the causes of international conflict11 in believing that feel that they have to appease the public by acting
the fundamental source of a state’s foreign policy was
on fears they do not believe, they may take extraordithe nature of its domestic regime, and therefore that
nary precautions that greatly reduce the danger. In a
a regime like Iraq’s that ruled its own people by force
further twist, to produce the sustained spending and
would inevitably behave in a parallel fashion internapublic mobilization needed to continue these politionally. The sad results of the war have dampened
cies, officials may fan public fears (think of the “if you
the enthusiasm for such enterprises and weakened
see something, say something” campaign).
the hold of the theory behind it, but whether this is a
permanent or only a temporary development is yet to It is of course hard for the public—and even for exbe determined. Even if this war and the overthrow of perts—to estimate the likelihood of large-scale terQaddafi did not make us less safe, they were not the rorist attacks. What evidence would be relevant to
product of real security threats that have historically this task? If we hear that a plot has been foiled should
played such a large role in international politics.
we raise our estimate because it shows how active
terrorists are or lower because it shows the success of
Terrorism
vigilance and defensive measures?
Whether or not America’s previous adventures have
On balance, I find it hard to see how terrorism is one
led to the current bout of terrorism, my previous analof the major scourges of contemporary life. But many
ysis does not address the validity of current fears. My
people take it as such, and indeed that is the whole
claim that they are vastly exaggerated is quite simpoint of terrorists. If they had sources of effective
ple. The extent of a threat depends on the probabilpower, they would use it to overthrow the governity that it will materialize multiplied by the damage
ments they despise, alter the societies they find loathincurred if it does. The last factor is crucial. As horrisome, and establish their values as supreme. They
ble as they were, the recent attacks in Paris and San
cannot do this, and instead the goal of terrorism is to
Bernardino and the downing of the Russian airliner
terrorize—to induce fear and expectation that much
over Sinai killed relatively few people. Of course this
greater harm will follow. I do not think it will, but the
is no solace to the relatives of those who died, and evfrightened and frightening expectations themselves
ery individual death is a tragedy that affects a wider
are not without their consequences.
circle of people, but in the cold-blooded calculus of
national security these numbers are tiny and pale not
only in comparison to previous wars, but also when
compared to everyday threats as noted at the start of
this essay.
A rebuttal is that the past does not always predict the
future, and the fact that terrorist attacks have so far
killed only small numbers does not mean that this
pattern will continue to hold true. Of course this is
right, but it is crucial to realize that terrorists can kill
massive numbers only if they use infectious biolog-

Notes
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Is Plan Colombia a Model?
An Analysis of Counternarcotics
Strategies in Colombia1
Jonathan D. Rosen, FIU
Bruce M. Bagley, University of Miami

Abstract
This article examines Plan Colombia, which began as
a counternarcotics program in 2000. The U.S. has allocated more than $8 billion to the country via Plan Colombia from 2000 to 2012. The article examines some
of the successes of Plan Colombia. Some experts and
policymakers have touted Plan Colombia as a model
for other countries facing problems with drug trafficking, organized crime, and insurgency. This work
focuses on the lessons learned from Plan Colombia
and provides a critical perspective of the concept of
models
Drug trafficking and organized crime continue to be
important issues on the U.S. security agenda. Colombia has been at the epicenter of the U.S.-led war on
drugs for decades. Colombian President Juan Manuel
Santos (2010-2018) traveled to Washington, D.C. on
February 4, 2016 to visit President Barack Obama and
celebrate 15 years of Plan Colombia, which began as
a counternarcotics plan.2 Juan Carlos Pinzón, Colombia’s ambassador to the United States, has also been
promoting strengthening cooperation between the
U.S. and Colombia. Plan Colombia has been touted
as a model for other countries suffering as a result of
drug trafficking and organized crime as well as insurgency movements. This article is an effort to analyze
the concept of Plan Colombia as a model for other
countries, particularly after the U.S. has provided Colombia with $10 billion in assistance over the past 15
years.3

Historical Background
By the end of the 1990s, Colombia faced major economic challenges as well as high levels of insecurity
in the country. Colombia is a complex country because in addition to drug traffickers the country has
had more than 50 years of internal armed conflict
as various guerrilla organizations exist in Colombia.

The largest guerrilla organization is the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarias de Colombia—FARC). The FARC
participate in various illicit activities such as drug
trafficking, organized crime, extortion, and kidnapping. President Andrés Pastrana (1998-2002) sought
support from the U.S. to prevent the situation in Colombia from worsening. Pastrana desired to end the
internal armed conflict and focus first on peace and
developmental issues and then drug trafficking and
organized crime. The Clinton administration changed
the initial plan, focusing more on drug trafficking and
organized crime as it did not want to draw the U.S.
into Colombia’s internal armed conflict. While President Pastrana envisioned a plan financed by the international community, European governments did
not agree with the reversal of the formula by the Clinton administration. As a result, Plan Colombia was financed solely by the U.S. In 2000, the U.S. Congress
passed Plan Colombia and the Clinton administration
signed it into law.4 Plan Colombia focused on “hard”
components such as strengthening the military and
combating coca cultivation as opposed to alternative
development. The original goal of Plan Colombia was
to reduce drug cultivation, processing, and trafficking
by 50 percent in the first six years of the initiative.5
According to Adam Isacson, from 2000 to 2016, 71
percent of the financial resources went towards the
police and military assistance, while only 29 percent
went towards institutional an economic assistance.6

Shifts in the Goals of Plan Colombia
The goals of Plan Colombia evolved over time. The
events of September 11, 2001 altered U.S. foreign
policy as the Bush administration launched a global
war on terror. President Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010) recognized that he had to change the perceptions of the
Colombian conflict in order to fit within the broader
foreign policy goals of the U.S. President Uribe argued that Colombia did not have an internal armed
conflict but rather terrorists. He contended that the
FARC in Colombia are narco-terrorists or narco-guerrillas. President Bush bought into the re-orientation of
Plan Colombia and provided the Uribe administration
with the financial support necessary. The Bush administration supported Colombia in its fight against
the narco-terrorists for several reasons. First, Colombia has historically been a key ally of the U.S. Second, the Bush administration received criticism that
it was at war against the Muslim world. Supporting
the Colombian government enabled President Bush
Global Security Review | 8

to demonstrate that it helped governments combat
terrorism around the globe, regardless of religion or
geographic region. Third, Colombia is located in an
important position and an unstable Colombia could
impact U.S. security as well as regional security.7

In addition to being the number one coca cultivating
country, cocaine production has continued in Colombia. In 2008, Colombia’s potential manufacturing
capability of cocaine was 450 tons. While the manufacturing of cocaine declined slightly over the years,
cocaine production has remained high: 410 tons in
The FARC concerned the Uribe administration as this
2009; 350 tons in 2010; 345 tons in 2011; and 309 tons
guerrilla group dominated large parts of rural Colomin 2012.18 The results of the partial successes of Plan
bia. Uribe sought to combat this guerrilla organiza- Colombia are that drug routes have shifted to other
tion and prevent them from expanding. In the early countries like Mexico.19 However, routes are returning
2000s, there were discussions among experts about to Colombia. Thus, despite these partial victories,20
Colombia being on the brink of becoming a failed the overall situation has not changed as drugs remain
state.8 Support from the U.S. enabled the Colombian purer, cheaper, and more readily available than when
government to modernize and professionalize the
the U.S. launched the war on drugs in 1971.21
Colombian Army. As a result, the Uribe administration dealt crushing blows to the FARC, which was in Plan Mexico and the Concept of a Model
part due to the military training and support that the
As a result of the successes, Plan Colombia has been
U.S. government provided the Colombian military. By
promoted as a model for other countries suffering
2000, the FARC had approximately 20,000 members.9
The number of FARC members decreased to 8,000 in from organized crime, drug trafficking, and guerilla
groups. Mexican President Felipe Calderón (20062010 from 16,000 in 2002.10
2012) sought support from the U.S. to combat drug
11
Plan Colombia had “partial victories,” as security lev- trafficking organizations. The Bush administration
els improved over time and the state’s control of the supported the Mexican government with a Plan Mexcountry’s territory increased. In 2005, Colombia had ico. The name of the Plan eventually changed to the
801 recorded kidnappings. The number of kidnap- Mérida Initiative in order to disassociate it from Plan
pings decreased from 523 in 2007 to 213 in 2009.12 Colombia.22 While there are differences between the
In 2014, Colombia recorded 288 kidnappings. In ad- Mérida Initiative and Plan Colombia, the overall stratdition to decreases in the number of kidnappings, egies have similarities. Both initiatives have focused
Colombia also witnessed a decline in homicides. In on “hard” components and combating drug traffick2005, for example, Colombia had a national homicide ing and organized crime, particularly by using the
rate of 42.2 per 100,000 inhabitants. By 2014, the ho- military. Calderón militarized the drug war in Mexico
micide rate decreased to 28.0 per 100,000.13 In sum, in part because he did not have high levels of confiColombia saw increases in security according to vari- dence in the police as a result of the high levels of corous metrics.14
ruption.23 The result has been extreme levels of violence. During the Calderón presidency, 70,000 people
Plan Colombia, however, was less successful in terms
died as a result of drug-related violence and another
of reducing drug trafficking and organized crime.
26,000 disappeared.24 The goals of the Mérida InitiaAerial eradication has been a major element of Plan tive have been altered under the Obama administraColombia. The spraying of herbicides has had en- tion as efforts have been made to focus more on the
vironmental and health consequences. In addition rule of law and strengthening institutions. Despite
to the negative ramifications of aerial spraying prothis shift, Mérida Initiative funding levels have been
grams, such efforts have not been effective as coca lower than Plan Colombia: $143 million in FY 2011 to
cultivation has simply shifted between departments $194.2 million in FY 2014.25
of Colombia and to other countries in the Andes. In
December 2007, Colombia cultivated 98,899 hectares There have also been talks about a Plan Colombia
of coca. The number of hectares declined to 63,762 for Central America,26 particularly since this region
and 47,790 in December 2011 and December 2012, has become extremely violent in large part due to
respectively.15 Peru became the leading coca cultivat- drug trafficking and organized crime. In 2012, Honing country in the world in 2013.16 In 2015, Colombia duras recorded 85.5 homicides per 100,000 people,
regained its status as the leading coca cultivator in making it the most violent non-warring country in
the world.17
the world.27 In 2015, El Salvador surpassed Honduras
as the most violent non-warring country.28 Retired
Global Security Review | 9

Admiral James Stavridis, who led the U.S. Southern
Command in Miami from 2006-2009,29 advocated
for a Plan Colombia for Central America. He argues,
“We need a ‘Plan Central America,’ much as we had a
‘Plan Colombia,’ and now is the time to explore what
that should look like.”30 Yet some experts have questioned a Plan Colombia for Central America. Michael
Lohmuller contends, “Ultimately, while it is right to
appeal for increased US attention to a region plagued
by violence and crime, Central America is not Colombia. Policymakers must therefore be cautious about
using Plan Colombia as a road map for action in the
region, and should avoid indiscriminately taking its
lessons as gospel.”31
Plan Colombia has not only been advocated as a model for countries in Latin America but other countries
around the world. It has been argued that Afghanistan could learn from the lessons of Plan Colombia.32
General Peter Pace, for instance, maintains that “the
model that is present here in Colombia where the
Armed Forces of the country have rid certain areas
of terrorists and then, very importantly, the government has followed with projects that have brought
electricity and water and jobs.”33 Despite the occupation of the country by U.S. troops for more than a
decade, Afghanistan remains the leading producer of
opium poppy, which is the key ingredient for heroin.
In 2012, Afghanistan produced 95 percent of the opium world-wide.34
Such discussions are despite the fact that many critics
have argued that Plan Colombia has not been successful on the drug front. Plan Colombia has focused
on supply-side strategies as opposed to addressing
various underlying issues. Plan Colombia was originally designed as a counternarcotics program, and
the results have been underwhelming. The problem
with supply-side strategies is that they fail to address
the demand for drugs. The logic is that criminal organizations and guerilla groups will continue to traffic
drugs—and other illicit commodities—as long as a
market exists.

Plan Colombia do not help strengthen weak institutions within Colombia. More resources could be allocated to helping the Colombian government—and
other governments—reform its institutions. Major
institutional reforms are needed in Colombia—and
other countries—in order to consolidate democracy.
Strengthening institutions will help combat the
number of human rights abuses that have occurred
in countries like Colombia and Mexico.35 In 2008,
there were over 800,000 individuals who had been
victimized in Colombia, demonstrating that human
rights abuses continue to be a serious issue.36 Certain
groups have been vulnerable, particularly various
indigenous communities and Afro-Colombians. Colombia has seen more than 5.7 million people who
have been internally displaced since June 2014.37 Colombian soldiers have also been involved in what is
known as the false positives scandal where they killed
civilians and dressed them in FARC uniforms in order
to receive rewards. José Miguel Vivanco claims that
“[f ]alse positive killings amount to one of the worst
episodes of mass atrocity in the Western Hemisphere
in recent years, and there is mounting evidence that
many senior army officers bear responsibility.”38 While
Plan Colombia is not responsible for all human rights
abuses in Colombia as the country has an internal
armed conflict, the argument is that the militarization of the strategy has contributed to human rights
abuses.39 Sweeping assaults on Afro-Colombian and
indigenous communities and the disregard for human rights during the Uribe administration suggests
that the price of professionalization of the Colombian
military was quite high.

A model like Plan Colombia is also problematic because it does not provide sufficient resources for
addressing development issues. Unemployment, inequality, and lack of opportunities are contributing
factors to drug trafficking and organized crime. The
problem of the ninis—youth who ni estudian ni trabajan (neither work nor study)—has become a major
issue in many Latin American countries, not just Colombia.40 A model that seeks to focus on combating
Another issue with Plan Colombia has been the failure the supply of drugs fails to address the socioeconomto address other important problems. Plan Colombia ic challenges. Coca cultivation remains a major issue
focused the bulk of the resources on strengthening in Colombia because campesinos do not have other
the military and combating the guerrilla organiza- viable options as other products do not grow in the
tions as well as drug trafficking. However, this Plan jungle or the Andes Mountains.41 In addition, peasant
did not provide sufficient funding to combat corrup- farmers can earn more for growing coca than other
tion and impunity. Colombia—as well as Mexico and products, which helps explain why they resort to culCentral American countries—has very high levels of tivating coca.
corruption and impunity. The military components of
Global Security Review | 10

Conclusion
Drug trafficking, organized crime, and guerrilla movements as well as other forms of insurgency will continue to be key priorities on the U.S. national security
agenda. Debates have existed among academics and
policy analysts as to how successful Plan Colombia
has been. While some analysts have argued that Plan
Colombia has been very successful as security has
increased in Colombia,42 others have questioned the
accomplishments of this Plan. Adam Isacson asserts
that “[w]ords like ‘success’ and ‘model’ are unhelpful
to understanding Colombia’s experience. It has come
with too many scandals, abuses, disappointments
and high costs to be considered a template for other
troubled states receiving U.S. assistance, like Mexico
or Afghanistan.”43 Some individuals, like Isacson, have
argued that the security gains of Plan Colombia could
be reversed and question whether Colombia is safer
today.44 There are still other internal armed actors in
Colombia and human rights abuses continue to be a
major concern, particularly among certain sectors of
the population such as Afro-Colombians, labor organizations, and various indigenous groups.
Models like Plan Colombia that focus on “hard” components fail to address the various underlying challenges such as corruption, impunity, and weak institutions. In addition, some experts have argued that
Plan Colombia has not been successful in terms of
drugs as coca cultivation and drug production have
continued. In sum, Plan Colombia shows that there
are key lessons for policy-makers with regard to what
has worked and what has not worked in efforts to
combat drug trafficking as well as guerilla organizations.45 It is important to note that each country is different, and a general model does not take into consideration the nuances of each country.
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Energy Security in the United
States:
A Glance at the Major Issues
Marten Brienen, Oklahoma State University

Abstract
The article analyzes U.S. energy security and begins
with an examination of the U.S. energy profile. The
article then explores some of the major threats to U.S.
energy security. Today, the U.S. is in a comfortable
position in terms of its energy supply. However, great
debates exist with regard to the size of hydrocarbon
reserves. Disputes also continue regarding how long
the U.S. will be able to use technology to extract gas
and oil. While the U.S. has witnessed a boom in natural gas, hydraulic fracturing, or fracking, has caused
many Americans to worry about the consequences of
such practices.

the ability of the country to guarantee reliable access
to affordable energy to cool, heat, and illuminate our
homes, to fuel our cars, trucks, trains, and airplanes,
and to keep the industrial motor humming along.
Anything that has the potential to disrupt these processes thus poses a threat to our economic wellbeing
and quality of life.
Given that the United States remains a net importer of
energy, this means that our energy security depends
at least in part on the reliability of foreign sources of
crude oil and natural gas and that our focus must be
on the potential for disruption of those foreign supplies. To some extent—as demonstrated in the 1973
crisis—this puts the U.S. at the mercy of producers of
the energy resources upon which we depend, a fact
also exploited by Hugo Chávez of Venezuela, who repeatedly threatened to cut off the U.S. from its very
sizeable oil reserves.5 Naturally, then, we must look
at domestic production capacity: our dependence
on foreign sources of oil and natural gas is, after all, a
direct function of our inability to meet energy needs
domestically.

The economic well-being of the United States is directly tied to its access to affordable energy. Indeed,
every major economic crisis the country has traversed has been accompanied by high oil prices.1 The
connection between U.S. prosperity and access to affordable energy is so obvious, that this has in the past
been used by those who supply the U.S. with energy
(in the form of the “petroleum weapon”) as a weapon in an attempt to force political action: this was the
case during the 1973 oil shock, when OPEC members
decided to punish the U.S. for its support of Israel in
the Yom Kippur war by restricting oil supplies and
raising the price of crude oil, resulting in a deliberate
crippling of the U.S. economy.2

There is, of course, more to the story of our energy
security. There are consequences to our dependence
on fossil fuels, given that they are non-renewable resources and that they are responsible for changes in
the planetary climate, which in turn may in the intermediate to long-term produce serious threats to U.S.
national security. 6 In addition, there are some other
concerns which are not generally considered by the
general public, but which may ultimately create more
vulnerability than our dependence on foreign energy resources. In the following pages, I will discuss U.S.
energy security in the context of a volatile world.

It was, of course, the 1973 oil shock that first caused
political leaders in the U.S. to really consider the notion of energy security, notably with Richard Nixon’s
1973 “Project Independence,” which was intended to
reduce U.S. reliance on imported energy, particularly
crude oil from OPEC countries.3 Equally important was
the 1979 oil shock, caused by the Iranian revolution,
which put President Jimmy Carter in the uncomfortable position of having to effectively beg the nation
to reduce its energy consumption and contributing
directly to President Carter’s electoral loss to Ronald
Reagan.4

Oil holds a very privileged position in the American
public imagination. It is one of precious few commodities the price of which is discussed with regularity in the popular media. Just about every American
can name the price of a gallon of gasoline, and more
than a few will be able to tell you the current going
rate for a barrel of crude oil. The same can decidedly not be said of a kilogram of uranium or indeed a
ton of coal—other than perhaps in some corners of
Appalachia. This is, of course, due to the fact that out
of the many forms of energy we consume, gasoline
happens to be the one product that Americans pay
for directly at the pump. When oil prices are low, consumers not only feel it in their pocketbooks, but they

The idea of energy security effectively revolves around

Energy Profile
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can see it while they fill up their cars. Given the direct
link between the price of a barrel of crude oil and that
of a gallon of gasoline, this produces an acute awareness of oil prices and one that is not matched when
it comes to the other forms of energy we consume.
Monthly electric bills are more difficult to interpret
and are not generally read in great detail to see how
much we are paying per KwH this month. Oil alone
holds our fascination.

2005 to 3.43 Bbl in 2015,12 constituting a reduction of
some 32 percent in imports. Domestic production of
oil—primarily due to increased tight oil production—
increased from 1.89 Bbl in 2005 to 3.44 Bbl in 2015.13

As imports of petroleum have fallen, a shift has also
taken place in the origin of imported petroleum.
While OPEC still contributes a large share of imported petroleum, its share has been steadily falling in
favor of exporters within the Western Hemisphere,
Oil is indeed important: transportation alone ac- especially Canada. Between 2010 and 2015, imports
counts for 28 percent of total energy consumption in from OPEC countries fell from 1.79 Bbl to 1.05 Bbl,
the U.S., making it the second most energy-intensive while imports from Canada rose from 0.93 Bbl to 1.37
sector in the country after the generation of electrici- Bbl. As of 2015, Canadian imports account for about
ty (39 percent), followed by industry (22 percent), and 28 percent of the total, followed by Saudi Arabia (13
residential and commercial energy consumption (11 percent), Mexico (10 percent), and Venezuela (9 perpercent). Coal remains the most important fuel for cent).14
our power plants (37 percent), while natural gas (26
These shifts have meant that even though the U.S. repercent), nuclear power (22 percent), and renewables
mains heavily dependent on imported petroleum—
(13 percent) make up the remainder: the sector congiven that the U.S. produces only about 60 percent
sumes virtually no oil. This makes petroleum the most
of its total demand—that dependence has been deimportant source of energy in the U.S. at 36 percent
creasing. At the same time, more of the demand is
of the total, followed by natural gas (29 percent), coal
being met by producers in the region. The latter point
(16 percent), renewables (10 percent), and nuclear (9
is especially important when we consider U.S. vulnerpercent).⁷
ability to oil shock in the framework of the extreme
It is important to remark on the ongoing changes volatility that marks portions of the Middle East and
that are transforming the energy landscape. The most North Africa.15
important of these has been the development of unconventional reserves of oil and gas in the form, pri- Threats to U.S. Energy Security
marily, of shale.8 Innovations in horizontal drilling and The United States is currently in a relatively comforthydraulic fracturing or fracking have allowed for a re- able position with regard to its energy supply: its
awakening of the U.S. energy sector, especially with dependence on imports of petroleum is significantregard to the production of natural gas. As a result ly reduced from just a decade ago, it is currently the
of this boom, the U.S. is now the world’s leading pro- leading producer of natural gas, and oil is currently
ducer of natural gas with an annual output of about relatively inexpensive. When it comes to energy se27.2 Tcf (2015).9 This has had several effects: it has led curity, the main things to address are 1) our continto a reduction in the price of natural gas, which has ued ability to produce at current levels, or even to
benefited consumers. Moreover, it has caused utilities increase domestic production, 2) the ability of certain
to shift away from coal and towards natural gas for state and non-state actors to disrupt energy supplies,
the generation of electricity, which has reduced the 3) the possibility of regional volatility causing a spike
importance of coal in energy production and has the in oil prices, and 4) the long-term effects of our reliadded benefit of reducing the output of carbon diox- ance on fossil fuels to sustain our economic growth
ide by power plants.10
and overall prosperity.
Indeed, the shale revolution has resulted in a much It is very much in the nature of hydrocarbon reserves
reduced dependence on foreign imports to meet to be the subject of great debate when it comes to
domestic energy demands. Since 2004, total energy the actual size of those reserves and our ability to eximports into the U.S. have dropped from 8,310 Twh ploit them in an economically viable way. One of the
to 3,586 Twh by 2013.11 The most important energy tricky things about hydrocarbon reserves is that they
import, crude oil, has dropped significantly as well, in are hidden deep underground, where we cannot expart due to increased domestic production of tight actly take a good close look at them. Fields holding
oil: total petroleum imports dropped from 5.01 Bbl in
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great promise sometimes do not live up to that promise, while others prove more productive than expected. It is for this reason that we distinguish between
proven, probable, and possible reserves with a range
of caveats about what may or may not be technically
recoverable.16

finds itself in today with regard to the total of proven,
probable, and possible reserves is vastly better than
it was around the turn of the century. Will the U.S. become energy independent? Maybe.

This is a continuous source of great uncertainty and
allows for individuals, oft depending on their political
agenda, to make statements with regard to the continued ability of the United States to supply itself with
natural gas and oil. Indeed, the proven reserves in the
United States are good for about 11 years of production at current levels, which does not seem like very
much at all.17

It is important to contextualize this emphasis on the
theme of energy independence as an overarching
goal in and of itself, given that its importance for a
society’s economic prosperity is clearly overstated:
Venezuela is energy independent. So are Angola,
Equatorial Guinea, Ecuador, Libya, and Iraq. Singapore, Japan, Germany, and Hong-Kong, on the other
hand, import virtually every last joule of energy they
consume.21 Autarky is not all it is cracked up to be—
ask any North Korean.

The big question, then, is how long the United States
will be able to extract oil and gas from the ground.
The science behind estimating the productive capacity of known deposits is notoriously inexact, and this
can be seen in the vast difference in size between
our proven, probable, and possible reserves. There
are those who would like to keep focused merely
on the proven reserves, and in so doing can predict
that we have no more than 11 years’ worth of natural
gas left.18 That seems rather pessimistic: doomsday
prophets have been predicting the “End of Oil” for
a number of years now, not taking into account the
very real effects of technological advances in petroleum engineering. Even the term “technically recoverable reserves” is a flexible one that mostly reflects the
price point at which exploitation of certain reserves
becomes economically viable.

The issue at hand is not whether a country is capable itself of producing the energy it needs to fuel its
economic activity, but whether it can rely on a steady
supply of that energy at a reasonable price, regardless of the origin of that energy. Here, of course, lies
the rub. Dependence on foreign sources of energy
does create a certain vulnerability in that it creates
a reliance on the willingness of vendors to play by
the rules, and history teaches us that oil producing
countries—especially when they are members of
OPEC—are willing to harm their economic self-interest for geopolitical reasons. Russia has also demonstrated such a willingness.22 The concerns that exist
within the United States with regard to our inability
to produce domestically the energy we consume are
rooted in a history of manipulation by certain energy
producers upon which we have historically relied.

Given the very real uncertainty that exists when it
comes to exactly how much natural gas and tight oil
the United States is likely to be able to extract from
known and as yet unknown resources, any remark on
the future of the domestic exploitation of hydrocarbons would be almost entirely speculative. The Energy Information Administration claims that we have
resources for another 85 years of exploitation at current levels based on what it estimates current technically recoverable resources are.19 Those estimates
have been called into doubt in the past, but the predicted decline in production by those doubters has
not occurred. 20 What can be said to be true is that the
efficiency with which oil is extracted today from unconventional reserves is vastly superior even to that
of ten years ago. Thus, the extent of existing resources—discovered and otherwise—is in effect unknowable without active exploitation. By the same token,
what cannot be denied is that the position the U.S.

In addition to the deliberate manipulation by oil producing countries we witnessed in the 1970s, there
is the added concern of non-state actors who might
seek to disrupt supplies for religious and political reasons, as well as the disruption of supplies that occurs
when oil producing regions become embroiled in political conflict, as has been the case in Libya and the
Levant. On the other hand, it should be noted that organizations such as ISIS have shown themselves to be
perfectly happy to sell oil to the world markets: this
is, after all, how one funds the bloodshed they have
wrought upon Syria, Iraq, and Libya. It seems unlikely that ISIS cares very much who consumes the oil it
controls, so long as it helps them to prolong their miserable existence.23
At this point in time, however, the majority of our imports come from within the hemisphere and primarily from Canada, which seems particularly unlikely to
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become the next Syria. Rather, it is one of the most
politically stable countries in the world, and one that
seems unlikely to seek to inflict economic harm on
the United States. The only country in the region that
has specifically sought to block exports of its energy
resources to the United States has been Bolivia, and
at great cost to its own economy.24

In reality, winter storms and other weather phenomena cause more damage every year than any other
circumstance. Hurricanes cause people and industries to remain without power for weeks at a time.29
The potential for terrorism there is far greater than in
other parts of the energy supply chain: it is childishly
simple to cause great damage with the most primitive of tools, and there is some evidence at least that
While there may not be great need to worry about
we should actually be concerned about sabotage in
the end of the shale gas revolution quite yet, there
the grid.30
are serious concerns with regard to the production
of natural gas from shale, which may complicate the Conclusion
narrative. One of the least appreciated threats to natural gas production from unconventional sources has The world is not as it was in 1973. While OPEC still has
been the effect of fracking on inhabited areas. Fears a real capacity to influence the world market by eiof intrusion into ground water have sparked protests ther depressing or raising the price of oil, innovation
against fracking in numerous communities. Mean- in petroleum engineering has drastically altered the
while, fracking is producing significant seismic activi- landscape. In terms of reliable access to oil, the Unitty in areas such as northern Oklahoma, which was hit ed States sits in the favorable position of being able
by an earthquake in September 2016 that measured to rely on its northern neighbor: Canada is certainly a
5.8 on the Richter scale and caused some minor dam- much more reliable partner than Russia, which has in
age to the town of Pawnee. The United States Geo- the past disrupted European supplies of natural gas
logical Survey has warned of the potential for even for geopolitical reasons. In addition, despite the rathbigger earthquakes as a result of waste water injec- er continuous predictions of the imminent end of the
tion into disposal wells.25 This constitutes a true prob- shale oil and gas boom that has transformed the enlem for the industry, which has largely been unwilling ergy sector in the United States, proven reserves now
to acknowledge the connection between seismic ac- still look healthier than they did a decade ago. There
tivity and exploitation of oil and natural gas. Until the is simply no argument to be made that the United
shale gas boom, Oklahoma rarely experienced earth- States is not at this time significantly less vulnerable
quake activity, whereas in recent years the number of to deliberate disruption of its energy supplies than it
earthquakes has risen from two per year to over 4,000 has been for most of the period between 1970 and
per year, including some that have caused property 2005.
damage and minor injuries.26 It seems likely that an Nevertheless, there is reason to be concerned with
even bigger earthquake than the most recent one regard to our continued reliance on fossil fuels as the
would cause significant damage to a region that has main source of energy. While the switch from coal
no history of earthquake mitigation. There is, for now, to gas has helped reduce greenhouse gas output in
no good answer to the resultant conundrum. Indeed, the United States, global climate change and rising
it is interesting to note that this seismic activity is pos- sea-levels do pose a very serious threat to a number
ing a real threat to the largest reserves of petroleum of low-lying coastal regions, while changes in weathin the U.S.—in Cushing, Oklahoma—, which may be er patterns across the continent pose a real threat to
damaged by earthquakes produced by the exploita- agriculture.
tion of natural gas.27
There is also real concern about the effect of fracking
The most overlooked threat to our energy securi- on some regions of the country, and is especially true
ty, however, lies in the distribution of electricity: the in Oklahoma, which has become one of the most seiselectrical grid itself. The vast majority of disruptions mically active places in the country. There is no clear
that take place in the United States, and at times at answer to the concerns Oklahomans have: if waste
a very large scale, are caused by malfunctions in that water injection into disposal wells continues, then it
system, which is vastly overcomplicated and under- is entirely possible that damaging earthquakes will
funded.28 This has produced massive blackouts, in- follow.
cluding a recent one spanning the entire Northeast
and into Canada (2003).
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Assessing the Threat from
Terrorism in the Caribbean

Anthony Clayton, University of the West Indies

Abstract
Gangs can serve as a “force multiplier” for terrorism;
they are a source of recruits, weapons, and local
knowledge. Terrorist organizations such as Daesh/ISIS
are now skilled at recruiting disaffected youth, many
with prior criminal records. Any country with significant numbers of gang members with the potential to
be radicalized may therefore be a potential recruiting
ground for fundamentalists. Several countries in the
Caribbean appear particularly vulnerable, including
Trinidad and Tobago, which has already suffered one
attempted coup by jihadists, and Jamaica, which has
nearly 300 violent gangs and many disadvantaged
young men. There is a clear pattern of jihadist attacks
on tourists, and the Caribbean is one of the world’s
leading tourism destinations, so tourists may be the
primary targets rather than Caribbean nationals.

The Caribbean
Eight of the ten most violent countries in the world
are in Central America and the Caribbean.1 These
exceptionally high homicide rates are the result of
interlocking factors, including powerful criminal
networks, weak and compromised governments, corruption, and the profits to be made from trafficking
narcotics, weapons and people, extortion, and other
criminal enterprises. The violence deters investment
and spurs migration, which perpetuates the underlying social and economic problems, resulting in a large
number of poorly-educated, disaffected, and marginalized youth who see violence as the way to wealth
and power.

Recent Trends in Terrorism
Recent terrorist attacks in Paris on November 13, 2015
and in Brussels on March 22, 2016 highlighted that
the largest source of foreign recruits to international jihadist networks are disaffected young men with
prior criminal convictions. From 2001 to 2009, (i.e. before the rise of Daesh) about 25 percent of the known
jihadists in Europe had criminal records; mainly for
narcotics, car theft, and weapons trafficking. In Belgium, by August 2015, this had risen to about 50 per-

cent of the known jihadists.2 This suggests that Daesh
is particularly skillful at recruiting criminals and gang
members, who typically radicalize within a small network of friends.3 These recruits are often motivated
by excitement, power, and a sense of belonging; very
few are pious. It is therefore likely that a country with
high levels of violence and a large number of disaffected, unemployed youth will now be seen by terrorist organizations as a potential recruiting ground.
Daesh claimed responsibility for the Paris attacks
of November 2015 and called them the “First of the
Storm.” It is clear that Daesh no longer confines its operations to Syria, Iraq, and adjacent states, but now
aspires to a much wider conflict. Daesh operates with
delegated authority; the Caliphate provides guidance, training, and funding, but the time, place, and
manner of the attack is determined by local affiliates.
This appears to have been the model followed in recent attacks in Paris, Beirut, and the October 2015
bombing of a Metrojet Flight from Sharm el-Sheikh
that killed 224 people.
The nature of the threat has evolved significantly
since 2001, and the terrorist attacks in Paris reflect
a rapid recent reordering of terrorist structures, alliances, priorities, and capabilities. The threat is now
exceptionally fluid and complex, and very difficult to
pattern or predict, because the enemy is no longer
a single entity. Daesh is simultaneously an organization, a self-proclaimed state, the core of a network of
affiliated organizations and sympathetic individuals,
a religious and political belief system, and a malignant ideology that is being disseminated around the
world on a multiplicity of media and social channels.
The current surge in terrorism is the result of a number of deep and almost intractable problems, including the conflict between the Sunni and Shia faiths,
the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and the disbanding of the
Iraqi army (many former Baathist soldiers are now
with Daesh), Saudi Arabia’s support for Wahhabi (fundamentalist) Sunni imams, the complex, multi-sided
war in Syria, and a large number of local conflicts and
grievances, many of which now find common cause
and expression through Daesh. None of these problems are likely to be resolved in the foreseeable future, and many of them are metastasizing, moving
into new territories (especially ungovernable provinces and weak states), and evolving into new forms
(such as cyberspace). This means that the associated terrorism is likely to persist for decades to come.
Daesh is currently the most prominent and advanced
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incarnation of these problems. Even if Daesh could
be destroyed, the problems would persist and give
rise to some new organization. A permanent solution
would require resolutions to many issues, including
questions of borders, ethnicity, identity, governance,
faith, economic development, access to land, water
and other resources, climate change, and other environmental impacts. None of these are easy, and there
is no comprehensive solution in sight.

equipment to compete with Daesh.6
The Paris and Brussels attacks represent a major escalation of Daesh’s global campaign. Their publications
were exultant, and they have promised more such attacks around the world. Many potential recruits will
be motivated by these exceptionally high-impact,
high-visibility attacks.
The main recruiting channels for Daesh are existing networks of disaffected youth accessed via
prisons, charismatic preachers, leaders, and other
opinion-formers. Daesh is also highly skilled at psychological manipulation on social media. Their media
presence and ability to control the narrative are technically competent and skillful. Individual Daesh “mentors” will spend hundreds of hours patiently grooming valuable potential recruits over the Internet. They
reach out to troubled and/or disaffected youth, with a
message of glamor, violence, and comradeship. They
offer a simple, uncompromising, radical, and compelling vision to those who find life difficult and confusing, to those who do not feel that they have the life
that they want, to those that feel that they are not given the “respect” they deserve, and to those who feel
that they want to be more than a loser or low-level
gang member. Their method is essentially the same
as that used by every totalitarian movement; to set
life’s petty miseries in a grand historical context, to
blame another group for these problems, and to extol the use of violence against that group. In this way,
disaffected youth can feel that they are part of a great
movement to reclaim their rightful place in the world.

The key target audience for Daesh ideology consists
of troubled and disaffected youth. Many of those
who have been recruited in Western countries to kill
for Daesh were not particularly religious; some were
only recent converts to Islam. For example, Abdelhamid Abaaoud, the “mastermind” of the Paris attacks
on November 13th, was a student at a Catholic school,
and did not attend a mosque. He became involved in
petty crime before travelling to Syria in 2014.4 His actions appear to have been motivated by a desire for
power, violence, and unaccountability, rather than religion. Similarly, Salah Abdeslam and his elder brother
Ibrahim, a suicide bomber in the Paris attacks, used
to run a cafe in Molenbeek that sold alcohol and was
closed down for drug offenses. Their network of support was based on personal loyalty, disenchantment,
and petty crime, rather than radical ideology. Khalid
and Ibrahim el-Bakraoui, the suicide bombers who
carried out the attacks in Brussels on March 22, 2016,
had multiple prior convictions. Khalid was sentenced
in 2011 to five years for criminal conspiracy, armed
robbery, possession of stolen cars, and weapons; Ibrahim was sentenced in 2010 to nine years in prison for
attempted murder (both were paroled).5
The extraordinary and rapid success of Daesh reflects
This is a common pattern; many recent recruits have its ability to appeal to the disaffected with a compela history of personal or psychological problems, pet- ling narrative and to sell this with exceptional skill.
ty crime and gang membership, and a sense of alien- European jihadists come from a range of socio-ecoation. Daesh offers these people a very powerful mes- nomic backgrounds and areas, and from both immisage of glamor, violence and a sense of belonging to grant and native backgrounds; but the largest group
a great cause. Any country with a large number of consists of young men with criminal records from
troubled and/or disaffected youth is therefore a fer- urban areas, 7some of whom also have prior mental
health issues.
tile potential recruiting ground.

In 2006, the average age of European jihadists (at the
time of their arrest) was 27.3, with the youngest aged
16 years old.8 The average age may now be slightly
Daesh originated as an affiliate of Al-Qaeda but has lower, as a result of an increase in the number of very
now largely supplanted them. Daesh claims to be the young recruits, some just 15, so a typical jihadi forsole legitimate jihadi organization active today (this is eign fighter is now a male between 18 and 29 years
a part of their image and recruiting strategy); Al-Qae- old.9 The average speed of radicalization appears to
da is still a significant threat, but no longer has the have accelerated, with the process generally taking
image, momentum, recruits, operatives, financing, or weeks rather than months, and there is increasing

Daesh: The Social Media Generation
Terrorists
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evidence that jihadist recruitment tends to spread
through previously-established networks (communities, families, mosques, and gangs), where groups of
acquaintances already identify with each other.10 Given that recent immigrants may be easier to track, the
main threat in most European countries is now from
young, home-grown terrorists, typically radicalized
through contact with others or, in some cases, via social media, who are usually “off the radar” until they
commit their first serious action.

The Threat to Caribbean Nations
In 2015, U.S. Southern Command said that about 100
Caribbean nationals had travelled to Syria to train
with Daesh.11 In addition, a total of 337, 802 nationals
from terrorist-linked countries (Afghanistan, Algeria,
Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Nigeria, Pakistan, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,
Tunisia, Turkey, and Yemen) transited Caribbean nations over the period 2007-2014, indicating the ease
with which jihadists could enter the Caribbean. The
Republic of Trinidad and Tobago is probably the most
exposed to risk, partly because some eight to nine
percent of the population are Muslims; most of them
are moderates, but they also have the fundamentalist
group Jamaat al-Muslimeen, led by Yasin Abu Bakr,
which attempted a coup on July 27, 1990, seized the
parliament building, the main TV and radio stations,
and killed 24 people.12
Jamaica is less obviously exposed to terrorist recruitment than Trinidad and Tobago, but has even higher
levels of violent crime, with a homicide rate that is
currently sixth in the world. This is the result of a complex set of interlocking problems; Jamaica’s National
Security Policy notes that the Tier 1 threats to the nation include “transnational organized crime, including trafficking in narcotics, weapons, ammunition,
money and people, money laundering and cybercrime…gangs and domestic organized crime…contract killing, intimidation and extortion, kidnapping,
dealing in narcotics and illegal weapons and money
laundering…a political system that is still compromised by links to organized crime…corruption in key
institutions of state, including the security forces, police, prison and justice systems, and gang-dominated
communities.”13
As this suggests, Jamaica has deeper social, political,
and economic problems than the marginalized communities in Paris and Brussels. Jamaica is also home
to Abdullah el-Faisal (born Trevor William Forrest in

1963). He was raised as a Christian, but converted to
Islam at the age of 16, studied in Saudi Arabia, and
moved to the UK to preach during the 1980s. He appears to have been effective in radicalizing others; his
congregation included “shoe bomber” Richard Reid,
9/11 plot member Zacarias Moussaoui, and Muhammad Sidique Khan and Germaine Lindsay, suicide
bombers in the July 7th London attack in 2005. He was
convicted in the UK in 2002 on five charges of soliciting murder, served four years and was deported to
Jamaica in 2007.

Potential Target: Tourists in The
Caribbean
A single point of contact in any Caribbean island
could be the nucleus of a devastating terrorist incident. Recent terrorist incidents have involved small
numbers, typically from one to ten individuals, who
can inflict serious harm in a single or coordinated set
of attacks. There is a low level of awareness in the Caribbean of the potential threat from terrorism, but a
number of recent attacks have focused specifically on
tourist and leisure areas. For example:
In 1997, members of al-Gama’a al-Islamiya
killed 58 tourists at Luxor. Egypt’s tourism earnings fell that year by $1.17 billion, about 25
percent of Egypt’s revenue from the industry.
In 2002, members of Jemaah Islamiyah
bombed a nightclub in Bali, killing 201 tourists.
The event was planned to maximize civilian
casualties.14 The nightclub was known to cater
largely to tourists, and was targeted as a result;
members of Jemaah Islamiyah stated in court
that their goal was to cripple the tourism industry. Bali’s visitor arrivals fell that year by 22
percent; some 300,000 jobs were lost.
On September 21, 2013, al-Shabaab militants
based in Somalia attacked the Westgate shopping center in Nairobi, Kenya, and killed 68
people. The shopping center catered mainly to
the middle-class, UN workers, and tourists.
On January 7, 2015, members of Al-Qaeda
in Yemen attacked the offices of the satirical
weekly newspaper Charlie Hebdo and a kosher
market in Paris. They killed a total of 17 people
and injured 22. Over the following nine days
France’s revenues from tourism fell by 25 percent and then fell by another 26 percent over
the subsequent 10 days. Occupancy rates in
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Paris hotels fell by about three percent, but
reservations for restaurants and bars experienced a cancellation rate of 68 percent, which
suggests that people were not cancelling visits
to Paris, but were far more reluctant to go out
into public spaces.15

in the country is directly or indirectly related to tourism. Any terrorist incident that damages confidence
in Jamaica’s tourism industry would therefore have
immediate and widespread consequences to the nation—even if Jamaica was only the chosen location
for the attack.19 The deliberate sinking of a cruise ship,
for example, could result in over twice as many fatalities as the 9/11 incident, in which some 3,000 people died, as a large modern cruise ship can carry over
6,000 passengers and over 2,000 crew members. Any
such incident would probably have a long-term impact on the world cruise industry, which would affect
the Caribbean more than any other region, as the Caribbean currently accounts for over half of the world
market share of cruise ship destinations.20

On November 13, 2015, a series of coordinated
terrorist attacks in Paris killed 130 people and
368 people were injured, some 80-100 seriously. The venues attacked were all social hubs,
including a music venue and a restaurant. The
occupancy rate at Paris hotels fell 21 percent
on the Saturday following the attacks and 23
percent the next day, far more than the three
percent fall after the Charlie Hebdo attack,
which suggests that the cumulative impact of The tourism industry does demonstrate remarkable
two terrorist incidents had a far bigger impact resilience, and eventually recovers. After a major terrorist incident, however, tourism volumes typically
on tourist arrivals.16
fall by 25-75 percent and do not recover for some
On June 26, 2015, Islamists attacked the tourist
years, while the countries affected also have to invest
resort at Port El Kantaoui in Tunisia. They killed
in additional security, spend heavily on advertising,
38 people, 30 of whom were UK nationals.
and offer steep discounts in order to rebuild their
The bomb that destroyed Metrojet Flight 9268 customer base. During that time, a number of the relover the Sinai on October 31, 2015 and killed atively fragile tourism-dependent Caribbean econoall 224 people on board was probably placed mies could collapse.
on the aircraft at Sharm el-Sheikh. As a result, Conclusion
a number of countries advised against travel
to that area. Egypt’s tourism receipts fell by Several Caribbean nations have a number of attrialmost 50 percent, and many of the hotels in butes that make them potentially fertile ground for
terrorist networks, including:
Sharm el-Sheikh closed.
Jamaica’s tourism industry has already suffered as a
result of terrorism. After 9/11, global tourism volumes
fell by 10 percent. Visitor arrivals to some countries fell
by 30 percent, Caribbean arrivals fell by 15 percent,
and Jamaica’s arrivals declined by 20 percent. Many
Caribbean destinations had to discount heavily to try
to maintain room occupancy, and found it difficult to
revert to their former prices for years afterwards.17 In
spite of this, a survey of the tourism industry in Jamaica carried out in 2011 found that senior operatives in
the industry did not think that Jamaica was at serious
risk of terrorism because “we’re not quarrelling with
anyone.”18 If, however, the intended targets are U.S.
or European citizens, Jamaica might be chosen as the
scene of the attack, rather than the primary target (as
with the Bali nightclub bombing).

A large number of disaffected, disadvantaged
youth with very poor prospects.

Jamaica’s tourism industry now attracts over 3 million
arrivals. The industry generates some 13 percent of
Jamaica’s GDP; and 30-40 percent of all employment

A small but growing number of Caribbean
nationals who have travelled to Syria.

Serious corruption among public officials,
political patronage, and a democratic system
compromised by links with organized crime,
which fosters cynicism and despair of the prospects of legitimate change.
A large number of criminal gangs.
Availability of illegal weapons.
Existing fundamentalists, with contacts with
jihadists.
Extensive in-bound travel from nations with
active terrorist networks.

A large number of soft targets, such as tour
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ism resorts and cruise ships, catering predominantly to North American and European nations, where it would be relatively easy to
mount a “spectacular” attack resulting in a
large number of fatalities.

vestment. This must be accompanied by steps to end
the political culture of corruption and patronage, so
that people can trust their governments, and by reforms to the dysfunctional legal systems so that the
people can have faith in law, order, and justice. This
combination of measures represents the best way to
The nations of the Caribbean are predominantly
‘inorculate’ a population against the spread of viruChristian, but this is unlikely to provide protection,
lent and malignant ideologies.
as many recruits in other countries were only recent
converts to Islam. All the information presented here
is in the public domain, and therefore accessible to
terrorist organizations. It is therefore likely that terrorist organizations will come to the same conclusions, if
they have not already done so.

Recommendations
There are a few key steps that would help to increase
the resilience and preparedness of the Caribbean
nations. The first line of defense, as always, is to be
better informed. Thus, it is important to establish the
protocols and mechanisms for faster and deeper intelligence-sharing and cooperation both within the
Caribbean and with key partners overseas. This in turn
will require the better management of bilateral and
multilateral partnerships towards joint security goals,
and the removal of internal silos (Jamaica has already
integrated the counter-terrorism and organized
crime branches of the Jamaican Constabulary Force).
More effective immigration and border security can
start simply by training staff. More serious investment
would be required in order to improve the security
of transport and shipping infrastructure, especially
as most of the Caribbean nations have highly permeable marine borders. However, new technologies (e.g.
as fixed-wing drones) are increasingly affordable, and
would give a significant increase in regional air and
maritime domain awareness. Regional resource-pooling would rapidly enhance rapid response and search
and rescue capability, and address some of the most
significant resource and capability gaps in regional
defense and security systems.
The most important step, however, is to resolve the
deep social and economic problems in the Caribbean
that create pools of disaffected youth that can then
be recruited by either criminal or terrorist networks.
A combination of better-targeted policing and social
interventions will be required; the normalization and
reintegration of the high-crime, gang-dominated
communities and informal settlements will require a
transition to intelligence-led proximity and community policing supported by both social and private inGlobal Security Review | 25
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Climate Change and Security:
The Case of Florida
Daniel Suman, University of Miami
Abstract
The low-lying subtropical Florida Peninsula, surrounded on three sides by the sea, is highly vulnerable to the manifestations of climate change. Rising
sea levels are already responsable for significant
coastal erosion that threatens infrastructure, real estate, and Florida’s subtropical habitats. The State lies
in the path of hurricanes whose winds and storm
surges pose great threats to life and property. Rising
temperatures are likely to impact the most vulnerable sectors of the population, adversely impact agriculture, and threaten the health of Florida’s coral reef
ecosystems. Some local governments are beginning
to address the threats. However, the State of Florida
irresponsibly continues to take a “business-as-usual”
path.

Ecosecurity

Environmental Changes and
Climate Change in Florida
The emission of greenhouse gases (carbon dioxide,
carbon monoxide, methane, among others) to the
global atmosphere via the burning of fossil fuels and
biomass, as well as deforestation, has resulted in the
elevation of global atmospheric temperatures. Since
the Industrial Revolution, the concentration of atmospheric carbon dioxide has increased 35 percent
from 280 ppm in 1750 to more than 400 ppm today.
If these trends continue, CO2 concentrations may well
reach 600 to 700 ppm by the end of the twenty-first
century. Greenhouse gases trap infrared radiation
emitted from the earth’s surface causing an increase
in atmospheric temperatures. Land and ocean surface
temperatures have already increased about 0.850C—
the range lies between 0.65 to 1.060C—from 1880
to 2012.1 Predictions of the range of temperature increases, of course, contain a degree of uncertainty.
Panels of scientific experts organized by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have created various models that project global mean surface
temperature increases during the twenty-first century that range between 0.30 and 4.80C depending
on future global emissions of greenhouse gases and
mitigation measures that societies implement.2 Heat
waves will become more intense with longer duration
in much of the United States.3 Scientists reported that
2015 global temperatures were the highest on record
and the second highest in the continental U.S. (after
2012).4 Atmospheric temperature increases cause a
number of other environmental and, ultimately socioeconomic, impacts.

When hearing the phrase “national security” we often think about protection of the nation from terrorism, foreign enemies, drugs, and criminal activities. A
broader consideration of “security” also includes the
welfare of a society and its people that depend on
and benefit from environmental goods and services.
One responsibility of government should be to protect its citizens from threats, such as those mentioned
above, but also including disease, poverty, ignorance, As global temperatures rise, glacial and polar ice caps
air and water pollution, and damage to ecosystems melt. The volumen of surface seawater also expands
that provide numerous goods and services.
with increasing temperature (thermal expansion).
This short article examines some of the threats from Taken together, these factors produce an elevation
global climate change that challenge the southeast- of sea level. The IPCC estimates that by the end of
ern United States, particularly the State of Florida. the twenty-first century sea levels will rise between
The manifestations of climate change all bear some 25 and 195 cm with the most reasonable estimate
5
degree of uncertainty, yet the international commu- being 60 cm. The Sea Level Rise Work Group of the
nity of scientists and policymakers has reached con- Southeast Florida Regional Climate Change Compact
sensus about the reality of climate change and its Steering Committee has estimated sea level rise for
anthropogenic drivers. This article examines some the region using data from reports of the IPCC, the
of the unique vulnerabilities that Florida faces due U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the National Oce6
to climate change and urges the State’s leaders to anic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Using
take clear responsibility for implementing adaptive 1992 as a baseline, sea levels may increase from 15 to
actions that will mitigate the risks to Florida’s popula- 25 cm by 2030, 36 to 66 cm by 2060, and 79 to 155 cm
by 2100.
tion, infrastructure, and environment.
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When rising sea levels are projected horizontally,
many low-lying coastal areas will be flooded. Predicted areas that will be inudated are site-specific and
depend on coastal topography, land subsidence or
emergence, drainage patterns, and society’s ability
to defend the coastline. The World Resources Institute estimates that by 2060 sea levels on the Floridian
coastline could increase between 23 and 61 cm over
levels in 2012.7 Moreover, it appears that the rate of
sea level rise is increasing.8
Atmospheric warming will also lead to changes in
rainfall patterns and tropical storm intensity and frequency. Although climate predictions have inherent
uncertainties, models forecast that some regions will
experience increased rainfall while others will become drier. The dry southwestern U.S. will have even
drier conditions throughout this century. While the
variation in net rainfall in the southeastern U.S. may
not be significant, extreme rainfall events will become more frequent, intense, and irregular—as will
be the case in most of the U.S.9 Predictive models also
suggest that tropical storms will increase in intensity
and precipitation during this century.10
The global ocean is an important sink for some of
the increasing levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide.
Dissolved carbon dioxide alters the ocean’s carbonate-bicarbonate equilibrium leading to more acidic
conditions of surface seawater (ocean acidification).11
Even relatively small decreases in the pH of seawater
(more acidic conditions) can make it more difficult
for calcareous marine fauna to form their carbonate
exoskeletons. Four IPCC scenarios predict decreases
in surface seawater acidity between 0.06 and 0.31
(an increase in acidity between 15 and 109 percent)
by the end of the twenty-first century.12 Of particular concern are mollusks and coral reefs; the latter
are already experiencing a number of threats from
increasing seawater temperatures caused by global
warming and El Niño-ENSO events, viral diseases, nutrient enrichment of coastal waters leading to algae
blooms, damage from unsustainable fishing practices
and physical damage from vessels and divers.

The Case of Florida
Demography
According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Florida’s population was 18,801,310 persons, the fourth largest state. Population estimates of July 1, 2015 were
20,271,272—a percentage change of 7.8 in that five-

year period.13 Population growth rates in Florida are
among the highest in the country. In fact, Florida
ranks sixth in growth rates among U.S. states.14
Florida’s shoreline and coastal amenities are great
attractions for visitors and residents alike. The U.S.
Census Bureau defines counties bordering saltwater
as “coastal”. Using this definition, just under 14 million persons resided in Florida’s coastal counties in
2008—about 78 percent of Florida residents (compared to about 29 percent of the U.S. population).15
Almost 16 percent of the U.S. coastal population resides in Florida, second only to California.16 The population in Florida’s coastal counties increased by 12.9
percent from 2000 to 2008, yet percentage increases
for all U.S. coastal counties only reached 6.5 percent,
while that of the entire country was 8.0 percent.17
Florida’s population is large, fast growing, coastal, and
also relatively old. The State has the highest percentage of residents over 65 years of age of any state in the
country—about 18.3 percent.18 The percentage of seniors in Florida’s population should reach 21 percent
by 2020 and will continue to subsequently increase.
Economy
Tourism is the primary economic industry in Florida, and the State received about 90 million visitors
in 2012.19 Miami-Dade County is one of the State’s
primary tourist destinations accounting for about
30 percent of the $71.8 billion that visitors to Florida spend each year. Florida’s beaches and nearshore
and coastal environments are the principal attraction
for tourists.
Agriculture also plays an important role in Florida’s
economy. The agricultural sector is the largest in the
southeastern U.S. with citrus playing a principal role.
Citrus is a $9.3 billion industry in Florida.20 The State
produces more than two-thirds of the country’s citrus production and almost half of the global supply
of orange juice. Tomatoes follow citrus in economic
contribution with sugar cane and nursery and ornamental plants also making significant contributions
to Florida’s economy.
Environment
Florida’s natural environment is closely linked to
the sea. The state is a peninsula bordered on three
sides by the ocean. Florida has the greatest length
of coastline of any state in the continental U.S.,21 as
well as 1,200 miles of sandy beaches and 1,800 miles
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of coastline.22 The State’s elevation is relatively low—
the highest point reaching only 96 meters—and its
water table is high.23 Florida’s Coastal Management
Program defines the entire State as the coastal zone.
However, for planning purposes, only the 35 coastal
counties (of 67 in the State) are treated as “coastal”.24
Few points in the State are more than 100 km from
either the Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic Ocean. The
State’s unique position in the subtropics, as well as
its exposure to the sea make it highly vulnerable to
strikes from hurricanes. Of the Category three to five
hurricanes that made landfall on the Atlantic Coast
of the U.S. between 1851 and 2008, some 39 percent
struck Florida.25
Florida’s subtropical environment hosts the northernmost reach of shallow coral reef ecosystems and
mangrove forests with their associated flora and fauna and is the only state in the continental U.S. with
extensive areas of these ecosystems.

Vulnerabilities of Sectors to these
Climate Changes
Coastal Infrastructure
Recent reports from the World Resources Institute
(WRI) have projected initial vulnerabilities of Florida to sea level rise.26 Florida is the state that is most
vulnerable to sea level rise with large populations
residing at low elevations, and thus, highly exposed
to tropical storms and storm surges. These WRI reports focus on the State’s four southeastern counties
(Monroe, Miami-Dade, Broward, and Palm Beach) that
are the most urbanized, have the highest population
concentration in Florida (almost 6 million persons
in the four county area), and only lie several meters
above sea level. Miami-Dade County has more people
living less than 1.3 meters above sea level than any
state except Louisiana (and of course, Florida itself ).
About 25 percent of the county’s land is less than
one meter above sea level. Estimates of the value of
Miami-Dade’s beachfront properties range to about
$15 billion. Evaluation of cities most vulnerable to
losses from flooding rank Miami, Florida in sixth place
of global cities and first place of U.S. cities. The same
evaluation ranks Tampa-St. Petersburg, Florida as 16th
in the world and fourth among U.S. cities.27

rise value will place 1,221,837 persons at risk in Florida out of 4,310,983 in the U.S., while the higher value will affect 6,057,419 Floridians out of 13,115,250
in the entire country. Similarly, the WRI estimates that
about 40 percent of properties in the U.S. that are vulnerable to sea level rise are in Florida. These estimates
place Florida as the state most at risk from sea level
rise. The Nature Climate Change report mentions the
extreme risk faced by four Florida counties—Monroe,
Miami-Dade, Broward, and Pinellas (Tampa-St. Petersburg).
Several cities in South Florida are already experiencing flooding during high tide events, as well as extreme rainfall events. Several streets on the west side
of the City of Miami Beach flood about six times per
year during high tides (“king tides”). Using U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers estimates for sea level rise, the
Union of Concerned Scientists predicts that Miami
Beach streets will flood about 380 times per year by
2045.29 To confront this threat, Miami Beach is conducting an overhaul of its stormwater system, installing 70 one-way pumps, and elevating some of the
streets that are most vulnerable to flooding. The City
is spending $500 million on these initial adaptation
measures. Ft. Lauderdale and Hollywood in Broward
County are experiencing similar flooding during king
tides.30 However, protection of coastal areas from
flooding and storm surges will be extremely difficult
in many parts of Florida because of the State’s geology. Porous limestone substrate in much of Florida
suggests that protection of lowlying areas from storm
surges and sea level rise by seawalls will not be feasible.

Florida is clearly a target for hurricanes that may approach from the Gulf of Mexico or the Atlantic Ocean
bringing high winds, storm surges, high energy wave
action, coastal flooding, coastal erosion, loss of coastal wetlands, and saltwater intrusion. On average from
1900 to 2007 a hurricane struck Florida once every
two years, and a strong hurricane every four years.
Eight of the ten most expensive hurricanes in the U.S.
have affected Florida. Studies suggest that the State
can expect a ten percent chance of property and infrastructure losses that exceed $5.8 billion annually and
a five percent chance of loss of $19.6 billion.31 Many
experts predict that global warming will increase the
A recent study published in Nature Climate Change es- size and intensity of hurricanes. Increased storm intimated the number of people that will be affected by tensity compounded with Florida’s rapid coastal desea level rises of 90 and 180 cm in 2100—also taking velopment and population increases suggest that
population growth into account.28 The lower sea level potential losses to property from tropical storms will
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be extremely high.

global warming due to higher winter temperatures.35
The major challenge that Florida’s citrus industry facSea level rise, historical shoreline armoring (groins,
es today is Citrus Greening, an insect-spread bacterial
seawalls, and bulkheads), jetties, destruction of
infection that is now present throughout the State.
dunes, and the buildout of much of Florida’s coastline
This citrus disease impacts fruit color, size, and flavor
have resulted in severe beach erosion. Loss of sandy
and eventually kills the tree. The warmer temperabeaches means loss of defense against storms, habitures may also favor reproduction and the spread of
tat loss, and decreased tourism revenues. In response
insects that spread the Citrus Greening bacteria.
to the loss of Florida’s natural beaches, the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, the State of Florida, and in some Intensification of hurricanes could mean greater
cases local governments have funded beach renour- losses to Florida agriculture—not only from physical
ishment projects. Essentially all of the beaches in damage to plants and infrastructure but also because
South Florida have been renourished during the past of salinization and salt water intrusion. Hurricanes
30 years at a cost of approximately a million dollars also may facilitate insect movement that is responsper mile of renourished beach. While these projects able for Citrus Greening.
produce benefits, they also have adverse environFisheries and Marine Ecosystems
mental impacts and are costly and often temporary.
One wonders how long we will be willing to fund ex- Coral reef ecosystems are one of the most biologipensive sand replacement to protect low-lying barri- cally diverse on the planet. Barrier reefs provide nuer islands on which large-scale building should never merous ecosystem services, including attenuation
have been allowed in the first place.
of wave energy and shoreline protection. They offer
habitat for numerous species of fish and other marine
These multiple threats to coastal lands, property, and
organisms that are important for commercial and
infrastructure in Florida (roads, bridges, wastewater
recreational fisheries—including different species of
treatment plants, stormwater drainage systems, nugrouper, snapper, and lobster. The U.S. Commission
clear power plants, etc.) present grave risks to the
on Ocean Policy noted that about 50 percent of the
millions of Florida’s coastal residents, as well as to
country’s federally managed commercial fish species
Florida’s coastal tourism industry. A study published
depend on coral reefs for part of their life cycle.36 The
by the University of Florida estimated the economic
economic contribution from diving on Florida’s coral
impacts of climate change in Florida using two cases:
reefs is also significant. The contribution of 8 million
rapid stabilization of greenhouse gas emission and a
visitor-days annually from divers and snorkelers in
business-as-usual model.32 The study predicts that by
37
2050 the average annual losses from hurricane dam- Florida is close to $1 billion per year.
ages will range between $24 and $49 billion. By 2100
real estate at risk from sea level rise will have a value between $10 and $66 billlion. Tourism losses will
reach $40 billion by 2050 and $167 billion by 2100
or between 1.2 percent and 2.4 percent of the Gross
State Product.
Agriculture
Climate change in Florida may mean rainfall variability, increased droughts, greater incidence of extreme
rainfall events instead of more consistent smaller
rainfall events, and higher temperatures.33 These factors may increase stress for comercial crops and also
create greater susceptibility to diseases.

Coral reefs in Florida are already stressed from diseases, pollution, bleaching, direct damage from divers
and boat groundings, and urban and port development. The Florida Department of Environmental Protection reported that between 1996 and 2005, coral
cover in the Florida Keys declined by 44 percent.38 In
2006, NOAA’s National Marine Fisheries Service listed
two emblematic coral species (Elkhorn and Staghorn
corals) as “threatened” under the Endangered Species
Act. In 2014, this federal agency listed 20 more coral species as “threatened”—five of which are found
in the Caribbean. The two drivers directly related to
climate change—ocean warming and ocean acidification—could mean the death blow to Florida’s coral
reef ecosystems.

Citrus fruits are the largest contributor to Florida’s
agriculture. The State produces about 69 percent of The connectivity between coral reefs ecosystems, seathe U.S. citrus crop.34 Some researchers suggest that grass beds, mangroves, and other coastal wetlands in
yields of citrus in South Florida may decrease with Florida is well understood. Coastal wetlands serve as
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nursery grounds and homes for many species of Florida’s coastal fish during some stage of their life. They
trap sediments, are crucial to shoreline protection,
and help build the shoreline. Coastal wetlands host
many endangered species and are home to diverse
avifauna, including many migratory bird species.

contaminate water supplies. Increased standing water will also increase breeding habitats for mosquitos.

the growth and reproduction of introduced (exotic)
species over native marine species and could lead to
dominance of invasive species in some marine ecosystems.40

Response From The State Of Florida

Water Resources

Changes in precipitation patterns and an increase
in short term rainfall events may lead to greater deFlorida has experienced great losses of coastal wet- pendence on groundwater resources for irrigation.
lands during the past century due to coastal devel- This could increase competition for this resource with
opment and urban expansion. Sea level rise poses an public water supplies and also lead to overutilization
additional threat. Mangroves might gradually retreat of groundwater resources.
inland with rising sea levels.39 However, because of Southeastern Florida counties depend on groundwacoastal infrastructure development in Florida (roads, ter from the Biscayne Aquifer for the vast majority of
bulkheads and seawalls, buildings, and reclaimed their drinking water. Wells providing the municipal
land), coastal wetlands may not have the necessary water supply that once were close to Biscayne Bay
space to migrate inland with sea level rise.
have already been abandoned because of saltwater
Some studies suggest that ocean warming favors intrusion and have been moved further westward.

Public Health
Climate change also may impact human health in
several ways. Rising temperatures and extreme heat
waves have the potential to increase the mortality
of the most sensitive group in the population—the
elderly.41 The percentage of Florida residents over 65
years is higher than that of any state in the U.S.—suggesting a high risk for many Floridians.
Higher average temperatures and rainfall may also increase the incidence of certain vector-borne diseases,
such as dengue and the Zika epidemic, the later which
is linked to microcephaly and temporary paralysis.
Perhaps the range of these diseases will also extend
further northward in the U.S. with global warming.
Higher temperatures may also speed up the life cycle
of mosquitos and decrease the incubation period of
the virus living in Aedes aegypti mosquitos, the vector
for both of these diseases.42 The first cases of Zika in
the continental U.S. contracted from local mosquitos
have been confirmed in Miami in July 2016,43 and although the spread of this disease cannot be linked
directly to global warming, in the future we may well
discover some relationship.

Despite the State of Florida’s vulnerability to climate
change impacts in many areas, at the State level, planning for response and adaptation to climate change
has left much to be desired. In a 2012 evaluation of
states’ preparation planning for climate change, the
Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) ranked
Florida in Category three out of four categories; the
29 states in Categories three and four are “largely unprepared and lagging behind.”44 The NRDC Report
stressed the importance that the Governor has in
planning for climate change: “[w]ithout a top-down
directive from the executive level, there is unlikely
to be sufficient action by all necessary government
agencies within a state on climate change issues.”45

Recent responses to climate change impacts from the
Governor of the State of Florida have not been energetic to say the least. The current Governor Rick Scott,
a Republican who was first elected in November
2010, remains skeptical about climate change and
claims not to be a scientist. He has established an unwritten policy that State of Florida agencies not use
the phrases “climate change” and “global warming”
in their documents. Reports of this policy come from
Florida´s Department of Environmental Protection,
the Department of Transportation, the Department
of Health, and the South Florida Water Management
District.46 Such a policy stance from the executive of
Increased coastal flooding resulting from sea level the State most vulnerable to climate change impacts
rise and storm surges also creates a number of po- is unconscionable.
tential public health issues for Florida. Direct damage
to infrastructure may cause injuries, make access to While the State of Florida continues to ignore climate
hospitals and health care facilities more difficult, and change risk, Florida’s counties and municipalities
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have taken the lead in climate change preparation.
The County Commissions of the four southeastern
counties (Broward, Miami-Dade, Monroe, and Palm
Beach) approved the Southeastern Florida Regional Climate Change Compact (SEFRCCC) in January
2010 to create a united front to face regional climate
change. Since then the SEFRCCC Steering Group has
adopted consistent methodologies and assessed the
vulnerabilities from sea level rise in the four county region based on one, two, and three foot rises. In
October 2012, the SEFRCCC produced a Regional Action Plan with 110 Action Items related to reduction
of greenhouse gas emissions, water supply systems,
sustainable communities, transportation infrastructure, and emergency management that decisionmakers at the county and city levels can adopt to mitigate
and adapt to climate change.47 Although it will take
many years to adopt and implement the recommendations, these are important planning steps for local
governments.

Conclusion
The high vulnerability of Florida to climate change
across so many economic, social, and environmental sectors demands unified responses from various
levels of government—national, state, and local.
The on-the-ground adaptive responses will be implemented at the county and city levels. The federal
government may offer broad policy guidelines, scientific information, and funding for programs. The State
must provide guidance for land use planning at the
local level, funding for programs, guidance for local
decisionmakers, and coordination of State programs.
Today, the inability of Florida’s leaders to internalize
scientific information and their lack of comprehensive response to the high vulnerability of the State
to environmental, economic, and social harm is truly
irresponsible and will be remembered by future generations of Floridians who will ask why their leaders
delayed so long before accepting reality and taking
action to proactively address the climate change
challenge.
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Nation-State Hacking:
Uniting Policy and Code to Limit
the Threat

countries rush to bolster defenses2 and create newer,
more effective attacks. Nation-states may hide attacks
amongst a myriad of independent hacking organizations and may even mimic attacks used by indeMark M. Deen, Florida International University pendent hacking organizations. All of the preceding
factors make it extremely difficult to forensically differentiate between an attack from a nation-state and
an attack from an independent hacking organization.3 To further complicate this, some nation-states
Abstract
may use independent hacking organizations to assist
This article examines nation-state hacking and ana- in attacks against other nations. The most predomilyzes some possible defenses against these attacks by nant use of nation-state hacking is to resolve conflict
combining policy and code level defense. The article and policy disputes in the cyber arena rather than the
examines some recent incidents of nation-state hack- political arena. This article aims to examine the mething and evaluates the actions taken by the attacker ods nations may use to defend against these threats.
and the effected parties. This work focuses on a variety
Historical Context
of nation-state hacking incidents and provides a critical perspective on how policy and code level controls In 2007, a piece of malicious computer code called
could be combined to defend against these attacks. Stuxnet was used to disrupt the Iranian nuclear proNation-state hacking continues to be an important is- gram.4 Stuxnet succeeded in slowing Iranian progress
sue on the United States security agenda. Advanced in their nuclear program by severely damaging the
nation-state hacking threats can adversely affect the centrifuges by causing them to spin out of control
day to day operations of a nation effectively crippling while monitoring systems reported normal centriit with nearly complete anonymity. In 2013, the U.S. fuge operation.5 Stuxnet was the first tangible eviissued E.O. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cy- dence that nation-state level hacking was being used
bersecurity. On December 1, 2016, President Obama actively to alter international policies and politics.
unveiled the National Cybersecurity Plan to increase
attacked several US compaawareness of the threat that lack of appropriate cy- In 2009, China allegedly
6
nies including Google and RSA.7 The Chinese attack
bersecurity controls presents.
escalated in 2014 when China allegedly hacked the
United States Office of Personnel Management (OPM)
network and obtained the OPM database, which conNation-state hacking is an important issue on the
tains information about more than 4 million current
United States security agenda. Nation-state hacking
and former federal government employees.8
is defined as an attack or series of attacks conducted by one nation-state against another nation-state In 2014, North Korea purportedly attacked the comto defend national sovereignty and project national puter systems of Sony Pictures Entertainment.9 The
power.1 Nation-state hacking may provide access to North Korean attack significantly disrupted the netinformation that may take years or decades to access work operations of Sony Pictures and affected cuswith traditional methods such as the use of spies or tomers around the globe. The North Korean attack
surveillance techniques and in the twenty-first centu- was rumored to be a result of a Sony Pictures planned
ry has replaced the spy as the most effective and effi- release of a movie concerning the North Korean Prescient method to access secure information with little ident.
risk and significant reward.
Later that year, Russia allegedly launched an attack
The organizations creating nation-state malware are that compromised the United States State Departtypically well-funded, well-trained, and dedicated to ment and the White House. The attack permitted the
achieving their hacking objectives. While these team attackers to access non-classified information includmembers remain safe in a remote location their ma- ing information concerning the President in the form
licious code may travel deep within highly secured of emails and the President’s daily schedule.10
networks and systems thousands of miles away. Nation-state hacking represents a new arms race as The outcome of these attacks was that for a period
of time foreign nation-state sponsored organizations
Global Security Review | 37

had access to sensitive information within the United States government or U.S.-based companies. The
policy response from the United States government
was swift and decisive. In 2013, the administration
issued E.O. 13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity which defined the need for Information
Security concerns to be addressed on a national level.11 In February 2014, the United States government
released a Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity which provided guidance focused
on protecting critical infrastructure organizations
from attacks.12 The most recent iteration in U.S. policy concerning cybersecurity is the December 1, 2016
Report on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy
issued by the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity. The report calls for a greater investment
in cybersecurity mechanisms13 and provides some
actionable steps for organizations seeking to protect
themselves from cyber-attacks.

Policy And Why It Matters
All of the nation-state attacks involved the introduction of malicious code into trusted computer systems.
In most cases the malicious code was introduced either
by human interaction or previously unknown flaws in
the configuration of effected systems. The absence of
defined policy results in diversity within human processes and procedures. In turn, this leads to diversity
in the configuration of computing systems which creates weaknesses that may be exploited to gain access
to computing systems—often with increased levels
of system permissions. The application of well-defined and sound policies minimizes the threat posed
by inconsistent computing system configurations by
employing general rules that should be applied to all
computing systems. An excellent example of policy
is the National Institute of Standards and Technology
(NIST) Cybersecurity Framework. The NIST Cybersecurity
Framework was developed in direct response to E.O.
13636, Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity
and provides a framework to measure and enhance
cybersecurity mechanisms in order to protect government and private sector organizations. The NIST
framework provides a series of granular controls that
address network configuration, connectivity, and Information Technology practices. However, the NIST
framework provides very little guidance regarding
code level security. NIST does however provide excellent guidance regarding human processes such as Information Technology change management practices. In the case of StuxNet simple human policy rules

regarding system patching, system security monitoring, and the use of USB thumb drives could have
been useful in limiting the threat StuxNet presented.
Another example of policy and its effect in guiding Information Security practices is the European Union’s
May 17th release of the Network and Information Security (NIS) Directive. The NIS Directive provides a uniform
approach to securing information systems between
European Union (EU) member states. The NIS Directive recognizes that cybercrime may cross national
boundaries and facilitates cross border coordination
between EU member states during the investigation
of cybercrime. NIS requires that specific security controls are enabled where personal information concerning European Union citizens is being stored. The
implementation of the NIS directive fundamentally
affects the way that EU and non-EU organizations interact. The NIS requirement to add additional security
layers around EU citizen’s information requires many
organizations to alter the way they address Information security practices for data stored both inside and
outside the EU. The EU directives stresses the need for
sound information security practices such as encryption, secure destruction, and accountability for data.
However, it provides little information about programming code used to store and manipulate data.
Overall, neither the EU NIS Directives nor the Report
on Securing and Growing the Digital Economy issued
by the Commission on Enhancing National Cybersecurity address the concerns pertaining to code or
strong coding standards for security. Nation-state
hacking relies on poor code controls as well as a lack
of policies that govern human behavior. Many of the
policies are concentrated on the activities of humans
and are not focused on activities performed in an automated manner by computer systems executing the
commands stored in programming code.

Code And Why It Matters
At the most elemental level of computing systems,
sequences of commands are contained in scripts
referred to as code. The individual instructions contained within the code are then executed by the
computer system. Because computers simply execute the instructions contained within code they
cannot differentiate between malicious and benign
instructions. Anti-virus and anti-malware tools are a
means of restricting the execution of malicious code
on computing systems. Anti-virus and anti-malware
tools are based on known “signatures” of malicious
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code and are therefore incapable of alerting system used to compromise sensitive information.
users concerning the possible threat presented by
code for which signatures do not exist. Anti-virus and Conclusion:
anti-malware software cannot defend computing sys- Combining Code And Policy
tems completely due to the signature based nature of Current national cybersecurity policies focus on retheir operation.
stricting electronic access to networked computer
systems but do not address the need to protect comThe majority of nation-state hacking incidents reputer systems at the code level despite the fact that
quired the execution of malicious code on effected
this method is used by most nation-state attacks. Polisystems in order to facilitate an effective attack. In the
cies should also consider possible efficiencies by addcase of StuxNet the malicious code entered the Iraniing requirements for code level controls to limit the
an nuclear facility on a USB thumb drive.14 The code
stored on the USB drive spread rapidly through the threat presented by nation-state level hacking. The
facility and around the world by exploiting a previ- combination of policy level guidance and code level
ously unknown flaw in the Microsoft Windows oper- controls would serve to decrease the opportunity for
malicious code to enter into computer systems and
ating system.
adversely impact the operation of those systems. NaCode level controls such as code whitelisting may tional cybersecurity policy should also clearly address
limit the capabilities of malicious code.15 Whitelisting the ability for code to communicate from within the
is a process that permits computers to only execute network to outside parties. By blocking the ability for
code that is approved. Enacting policies requiring code to communicate outside of secured computer
that only whitelist approved code may operate on networks the ability to remotely control or send incomputing systems decreases the probability that formation from compromised computer systems is
malicious code may be able to run on these comput- disabled.
er systems.16 Whitelisting is a supplementary control
to existing anti-virus and anti-malware solutions and Nation-state hacking will increase in the future as it is
should be used in addition to these software counter- fundamentally a part of warfare. Protecting as many
key infrastructure computer systems as possible is an
measures.
effective method to limiting the threats presented
Furthermore, code is also contained in hardware by nation-state attacks. The human element may be
components. The code in hardware components in- controlled by effective policies and practices but ulform the computer how to communicate with the timately the code and instructions executed by comhardware component and is referred to as “firmware”. puting systems will define whether or not an attack is
Firmware code is stored in chips on the hardware com- effective.
ponent and is always present regardless of whether
or not a computer system has been restarted or reset. National policy should be expanded to address code
Firmware code executes within the hardware device level controls and provide some guidance on how to
and may not be visible to malicious code scanning implement these controls to create a complete aptools such as anti-virus and anti-malware software in- proach to securing national cybersecurity. Furtherstalled on the computer system. Currently, very few more, national policy should provide simple guidsolutions exist to validate the code stored in firm- ance regarding technologies such as whitelisting as
ware, but methods such as code signing, code valida- a method to limit the capability for malicious code to
tion, and independent code testing serve to validate execute on computer systems and as a supplementhe authenticity of firmware code. On September 6, tary control for anti-virus and anti-malware software.
2016, the United States Computer Emergency Read- Finally, the threat presented by malicious firmware
iness Team (CERT) issued advisory TA16-250 which stored on chips inside of computer systems and grey
discusses the threat presented by firmware executing market devices should also be escalated as a risk in
within “grey market” devices.17 Grey market devices the national cybersecurity policy. There is a unique
are devices such as network switches and routers that challenge to validate and verify the authenticity of
are resold on the secondary market by parties other firmware since it may not be removed without disthan the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). abling the hardware device. This provides a perfect
Gray market devices may have been tampered with platform for nation-state attacks to hide and operate
or have malicious firmware installed that may also be with little risk of detection.
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